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PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION 






This project investigates the potential role of project management policy in major 
systems acquisition for the Polish Armed Forces (PAF). It includes a short overview of 
program management in the United States Department of Defense (DoD); analysis of 
present procedures in the PAF; a cost and benefit discussion of implementing the policy 
in Poland; and finally, a discussion of possible solutions and implementation plans. 
The PAF have undergone major transformation since the fall of the Berlin’s wall 
and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Serious reduction of the PAF has been 
accompanied by technical restructuring and modernization of several major weapon 
systems, which must meet new, high NATO standards. Successful and effective 
managing of the acquisition process seems to be crucial for the new shape of the PAF. 
However, no centralized management across all phases of the acquisition process 
exists in Poland at the moment. Different military and civilian authorities dominate 
different phases of the acquisition process. There is an urgent need to implement project 
management policy in order to consolidate the efforts of all the branches and to ensure a 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This project investigates the potential role of project management policy in major 
systems acquisition for the Polish Armed Forces (PAF). It includes a short overview of 
program management policy in the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD); an analysis of 
present procedures in the PAF; a cost and benefit discussion of implementation the policy 
in Poland; and finally a discussion of possible solutions and implementation plans. The 
final product resulting from the project is a “step-by-step” plan for implementing a 
project management policy in the Polish Ministry of National Defense (MoND). This 
plan is supported by a proposal of the project manager’s job description, or charter. 
The project begins by introducing several of the most important definitions 
related to project management (Chapter II). This chapter briefly describes the following 
definitions: system, program, project, project life-cycles & milestones, risk management, 
cost estimation, total quality management, matrix organization, integrated product teams, 
and ISO 15288. 
The analysis of the U.S. DoD approach to project management that was 
conducted in Chapter III shows that there is no need to apply all the American solutions 
in the PAF. The main reason for this is that Poland allocates considerably less funds for 
national defense than the U.S does. The PAF, for example, does not need to distribute the 
acquisition process among the Services. Poland should rather centralize and consolidate 
the acquisition process in order to minimize administrative costs, secure better control of 
the projects to avoid duplication of effort, and finally build desirable integrity and 
transparency. On the other hand, the acquisition workforce in Poland must adopt the 
ability to work in matrix organizations from the American model. An Integrated Product 
Team approach could also be quite beneficial in managing acquisition projects in the 
PAF. 
The analysis of present procedures for major systems acquisition in the PAF that 
is discussed in Chapter IV proves that the acquisition process is highly fragmented. 
Different civilian and military authorities dominate different stages of the acquisition 
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process. Requirements determination begins in the Services; specifications are created 
within the Armament Policy Department (APD); financial resources are determined 
through cooperation of the Services, the Budget Department, the Council of Ministers 
and the legislature; acquisition planning is conducted entirely within the APD and finally 
procurement functions and contract administration are in the responsibility of the 
Procurement Department (PD). There is an urgent need to establish an authority that 
would consolidate the efforts of the scores of people who work on each project. This 
authority would ensure a successful achievement of the project’s goals and make use of 
public funds most effectively.  
A discussion of costs and benefits that is conducted in Chapter V proves that the 
benefits associated with implementing of project management policy in the PAF would 
outstrip costs. The most important benefits would be increased integrity and transparency 
of the procurement system, streamlining of the acquisition process, centralized decision-
making, better communication between stakeholders, mitigation of projects’ risk, life-
cycle costs savings, and improved total quality management. Costs on the other hand, 
would be mainly associated with educational preparation of the workforce and slightly 
increased management costs. 
Chapter VI presents three possible alternatives for implementing project 
management policy in the PAF. Alternative I was based on the proposal of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) National Acquisition Strategy Team (NAST) which, visited 
Poland in 2000. It assumed implementation of the policy on the strength of the APD. 
Alternative II assumed the establishment of the Bureau of Project Management (BPM) 
under the Secretary of State. Alternative III assumed the establishment of the BPM under 
the Chairman of the Office of Public Procurement.  
Chapter VII details two possible implementation plans: “the revolutionary 
method” (1 to 2 years) and “the evolutionary method” (3 to 5 years).  
My final recommendation is to establish project management structures by 
combining Alternatives I and II. Implementation, on the other hand, should be 
accomplished through the “evolutionary method.” This method provides the time needed 
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mainly for the educational preparation of personnel and the policy “test of effectiveness,” 
and also significantly mitigates the risk associated with “fundamental and cultural 
change” in doing business. As a “test of effectiveness,” I suggest applying the project 
management policy to all R&D projects conducted within the APD as described in 
Alternative I. Afterward, based on the lessons learned from the test, I suggest establishing 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PREFACE 
Competition stimulates innovation. In the contemporary world, to face 
competitors, an organization must constantly seek new solutions, new products, new 
services. Mr. Skip Hawthorne said: The only thing constant is change.1 Project 
management is about implementing change. 
Project management policy is widely used by both the civilian and military 
sectors across the entire world. Project management has certainly proved its value in 
many challenging projects, in almost every branch of industry and federal administration. 
The main goal of project management policy is to ensure a centralized and 
effective introduction of new ideas, approaches, products or services in an organization 
without jeopardizing its current operations. Generally speaking, project managers are 
responsible for ensuring that their projects will meet high priority goals specified up-
front. The most common project goals are expressed in terms of time schedules, budgeted 
costs, functionality and quality. Project managers could be appointed to manage R&D 
activities, to develop and introduce new products and services, to reengineer, redesign or 
modify existing products, to make procurements, to construct or rebuild, and many other 
such responsibilities.   
 
B. BACKGROUND 
Poland has been undergoing an enormous transformation since the end of the 
socialistic era. This transformation also concerns the Polish Armed Forces (PAF). The 
majority of the present warfighting systems are being replaced or will be replaced in the 
near future. Successful and effective management of the acquisition process seems to be 
crucial for the new structure of the PAF. Recent procurement projects, such as the multi-
year program to equip the Air Forces (AF) with a multi-functional fighter aircraft or the 
project to equip the Land Forces (LF) with the Armored Personnel Carrier, caused many 
                                                 
1 S. Hawthorne’s lecture in Naval Postgraduate School in August, 2003 
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controversies and speculations in the mass media. These projects proved that Poland 
needs to implement project management policy to ensure centralized and effective 
management of the acquisition activities, increase transparency of the procurement 
system, and streamline the decision-making process. 
 
C. PROJECT’S OBJECTIVES  
1. Primary Objective 
The primary objective of this project is to underline the role of project 
management policy in major systems acquisition for the Polish Armed Forces and to 
describe the recommended solution and implementation plan.  
2.  Subsidiary Objectives 
The main subsidiary objectives of this project are to become familiar with the 
U.S. Department of Defense’s approach to project management; analyze costs & benefits 
associated with implementation of project management policy; analyze present 
procedures for major systems acquisition in the PAF and propose possible alternatives 
and implementation plans for the Polish MoND. 
 
D. FINAL PRODUCT 
The final product resulting from the project will be a step-by-step plan for 
implementing project management policy in the Polish MoND. This plan will be 




II. DEFINITIONS RELATED TO PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
A. SYSTEM, PROGRAM, PROJECT 
1. System 
System is a very broad concept. Different environments use different definitions. 
However most often the system is defined as: 
A group of elements, either human or nonhuman, that is organized and 
arranged in such away that the elements can act as a whole toward 
achieving some common goal, objective, or end.2  
This project discusses major warfighting systems acquisition. The Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) defines a major warfighting system as: 
A combination of elements that will function together to produce the 
capabilities required to fulfill a mission need.  The elements may include 
hardware, equipment, software, or any combination thereof, but exclude 
construction or other improvements to real property.3   
Furthermore the FAR provides financial thresholds above which the concept of 
major systems are applicable as follows:  
• $115,000,000 for research, development, test, and evaluation, or 
• $540,000,000 for the eventual total expenditure for the acquisition 
The Polish MoND should define its own financial thresholds above which the 
major warfighting systems concept will be applicable. 
2. Program/Project 
In practice two terms, “program” and “project”, are used interchangeably because 
there is no basic difference between them. However, programs are generally more 
expensive and sophisticated than projects. Moreover, especially in the U.S., federal 
procurement projects are very often considered as the first level of breakdown of a 
program. 
The Air Force defines program and project as follows: 
                                                 
2 H. Kerzner, Project Management, p.77 
3 FAR 2.101 
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Program is the integrated, time-phased tasks necessary to accomplish a 
particular purpose.  
Project is within a program as an undertaking with a scheduled beginning 
and end, and which normally involves some primary purpose.4 
Universally, the term “program management” is used widely by federal 
authorities while the term “project management” is preferred by civilian industry.  
In this MBA project, I will consistently use the terms: project management/project 
managers. 
   
B. PROJECT LIFE-CYCLES & MILESTONES 
1. Project Life-Cycles 
Every project passes through certain successive life-cycle phases. Most projects 
consist of four phases: R&D, Serial Production, Operating & Support and Disposal. 
However, when we consider the project as a procurement of a fully developed product, 
we do not have to take into consideration the R&D phase. Similarly, when we assume 
that a product will be sold or granted to a third party following the Operating & Support 
phase, then we do not have to consider the disposal phase, except as pertains to the 
eventual disposal of hazardous materials.  
Different costs and risks are associated with each of the life-cycle phases. For 
example, if we decide to invest more of our resources in the quality of the product during 
the R&D and serial production phases, then we can minimize our expenses in the 
operating phase, and vice versa. The total life-cycle costs must be precisely evaluated and 
compared, especially during the source selection phase. Procurement authorities must be 
aware that product price reflects only part of the total life-cycle cost of the product. 
Project managers should analyze the project’s life-cycle phases and undertake the 
necessary steps to achieve desired goals. 
                                                 
4 H. Kerzner, Project Management, p.78 
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  Recent research shows that the operating phase is the most expensive. On 















Figure 1.   Project Life-Cycle Costs5 
 
Some of the phases, such as serial production and operating & support, can 
overlap each other. The reason could be that additional batches of the product are 
acquired during the operating phase so serial production must be continued. These 
additional batches of the product on the other hand will result in some batches of the 
product that are already in the disposal phase while others are still in the operating phase.  
2. Project’s Milestones 
Every project should be divided on specified-upfront, successive steps called 
milestones. Milestones are commonly used to evaluate the overall project’s performance. 
Practically, milestones are established for both acquisition process phases and contracting 
process phases. 
Acquisition process milestones are related to system development and production 
activities and generally encompass long periods of time (sometimes even several years). 
                                                 
5 R. M. Engelbeck,  Acquisition Planning – presentation slides, course MN4301,  
22 July 2003 
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Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) proposes the following milestones for an 
acquisition process: 
• Concept & Technology Development 
o Concept Exploration 
o Technology Development 
• System Development & Demonstration 
o System Integration 
o System Demonstration 
• Production & Deployment 
o Low-Rate Initial Production 
o Full-Rate Production & Deployment 
• Operations & Support 
o Sustainment 
o Disposal6 
Contracting process milestones on the other hand are associated with the 
acquisition cycle. The FAR proposes the following milestones for the acquisition cycle: 
acquisition plan approval; statement of work and specifications; data requirements; 
completion of acquisition-package preparation; purchase request; justification and 
approval for other than full and open competition where applicable; issuance of the 
synopsis; issuance of solicitation; evaluation of proposals, audits, and field reports; the 
beginning and completion of negotiations, if applicable; contract preparation, review, and 
clearance; contract award.7 
An acquisition process for a major warfighting system can consist of several 
contracting processes. Separate contracts can be awarded for different phases of the 
                                                 
6 DoDI 5000.2 
7 FAR 7.105 
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acquisition process e.g., concept exploration or disposal. Contracting process milestones 
should be established for every contract. 
 
C. RISK MANAGEMENT 
Risk is an inseparable part of every acquisition project. It is defined as a measure 
of the probability and consequence of not achieving defined project goals8 such as 
quality, functionality, cost or schedule. Eliminating risk completely is not possible. 
However several methods and techniques can be applied to predict, analyze, handle and 
minimize risk. Managers must realize that risk management is an active, continuing 
process that should be conducted during all phases of the acquisition process. 
DSMC Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition identifies four main phases 
of risk management: risk planning, risk assessment, risk handling and risk monitoring. 
1. Risk Planning 
Risk Planning is a process of developing a risk management strategy, determining 
methods and techniques that can be used in risk management and planning for adequate 
resources9.  
2. Risk Assessment 
Risk Assessment is divided into risk identification and risk analysis. 10 
• Risk Identification - a process of examining all internal and external 
environmental factors that can negatively affect the project and all aspects 
associated with the project’s performance, such as life-cycle cost, schedule, 
contractors and subcontractors. During this phase, all areas of potential risk are 
identified, classified and prioritized.  
• Risk Analysis - a process of determining the probability of the events that threaten 
the project and of estimating the consequences associated with these events.11 
There are many tools and techniques to aid this phase such as software modeling 
                                                 
8 H.Kerzner, Project Management, p. 879 
9 DSMS, Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, Part 2.5, 
10 DSMS, Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, Part 2.3, 
11 H.Kerzner, Project Management, p. 885 
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and simulations, prototyping, schedule network models and life-cycle cost 
models. 
3. Risk Handling 
Risk handling is a process of applying different techniques to control, avoid, 
transfer or assume risk. Examples are as follows: 
• Risk control - multiple developmental efforts or technological maturation efforts, 
alternative designs, early prototyping, incremental development, technology 
maturation efforts; 
• Risk avoidance - modification or elimination of those operational requirements 
and activities that put the highest risk on the project;  
• Risk transfer - developing requirements and specifications on the basis of 
functionality, acquiring services vs. products, applying different contract types, 
warranties and reliability provisions. 
• Risk assumption - acknowledgement that, in any program, risks exist that must be 
accepted without any special effort to control them.12 
4. Risk Monitoring 
Risk monitoring is a process of evaluating efficiency of risk handling techniques 
and conducting overall monitoring of the project’s performance in order to foresee 
possible additional threats and obstacles. Risk monitoring includes meetings to track risk 
concerns and progress. 
5. Risk Documenting 
Documentation should be realized during the whole risk management process. It 
should ensure quick access to risk management strategy, goals, plans, gathered data, 
analyses results and applied risk-handling techniques. Documentation should always be 
up-to-date with progress of the project and should reflect all forthcoming problems and 
uncertainties. Documentation should also include Project Management Office (PMO) 
reports, recommendations and lessons learned. 
                                                 




D.  COST ESTIMATION 
The term “cost” in acquisition often reflects the amount of money a procuring 
entity expects to incur to purchase an item. However, in acquisition of major warfighting 
systems, the term “cost” very often reflects not only the amount paid for the item but 
rather the total life-cycle cost of the item.  
Cost estimation is employed to determine if the price of a product/service is fair 
and reasonable. Generally, the procuring entity should employ cost estimation in 
procuring a non-commercial product/service when market price comparison is not 
possible. The classic example could be sole-source procurement.  
Costs are commonly divided into direct costs such as direct labor and direct 
materials, and indirect costs that consist of overhead, general and administration costs, 
selling expense, etc. Most cost components (drivers) such as labor hour rates and direct 
materials prices could be estimated by comparing them to typical market rates and prices.  
However, there are situations when there is not enough market data available to conduct 
such comparisons. In these cases, alternative techniques must be employed. The most 
commonly used alternative cost estimation techniques are  
• Historic cost method - applying cost historical data from the same or similar 
projects by adjusting to present economical and technological factors; 
• Modular pricing - dividing the item on several, separate, smaller modules and 
then estimating the cost of the module, and judging its complexity; 
• Parametric estimates - using the mathematical relationship of the item to one or 
more of its functions or characteristics, e.g., the cost per pound; 
• Expert estimates - relying on the judgment of an individual who can combine 
experience and instincts to estimate the hours required to perform the task. 13 
In serial production, the concept of learning curves can be employed for cost 
estimation. Learning curves represent an ability of a human to improve his efficiency in 
                                                 
13 R. M. Engelbeck, Acquisition Management, p.253-255 
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performing repetitive operations. H. Kerzner provides three conclusions on which the 
current theory and practice of learning curves is based: 
• The time required to perform a task decreases as the task is repeated 
• The amount of improvement decreases as more units are produced. 
• The rate of improvement has sufficient consistency to allow its use as a prediction 
tool. 
Figure 2 represents the relationship between the cost per unit and the total number 
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Figure 2.   A 75-Percent Learning Curve14 
 
E. TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
Total quality management (TQM) is a broad term that defines an overall way of 
doing business.  It is defined by the Besterfields as follow: 
an enhancement to the traditional way of doing business; (…) the art of 
managing the whole to achieve excellence; (…) both a philosophy and a 
set of guiding principles that represent the foundation of a continuously 
improving organization;(…) the application of quantitative methods and 
                                                 
14 H.Kerzner, Project Management, Figure 18-1, p. 929 
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human resources to improve all the processes within an organization and 
exceed customer needs now and in the future.15 
According to the Besterfields, TQM requires six basic concepts: management 
involvement-leadership, customer satisfaction, employee involvement, continuous 
improvement, treating suppliers as partners and establishing of performance measures for 
the process. Project managers should recognize all of these concepts of total quality 
management and create a favorable environment to accomplish each of them in their 
projects. 
Additionally, project managers must be aware that each project has certain unique 
characteristics and requires a specific approach to achieve quality. This unique attitude to 
the project should be determined during quality planning and ensured through quality 
control.  
The goal of quality planning is to define quality and develop overall quality 
policy, objectives, and standards that are most suitable for a particular project. Moreover, 
during the quality planning, appropriate performance measures should be established.   
Quality planning should be based on the comparison of quality cost and a 
project’s life-cycle costs. As mentioned earlier, a higher quality and a more expensive 
product guarantees lower costs during its operating and maintenance cycle. Project 
managers must make many “tradeoff” decisions during this phase. 
The quality planning phase is successfully accomplished when a precise quality 
plan is developed and appropriate techniques and tools for quality control are selected.  
Quality control is a process of ensuring that products and services that are 
delivered are as required, specified in the planning phase and contract - quality level. 
In the contemporary world, statistical methods and software-based tools are 
widely used to control quality. Statistical Process Control (SPC) and Six Sigma (SS) 
techniques are very powerful techniques that offer the potential to reduce the cost of 
quality while increasing user satisfaction. There are many advanced, automated systems 
                                                 
15 D. H. Besterfield, C. Besterfield-Michna, G. Besterfield, M. Besterfield-Sacre, 
Total Quality Management, p.1 
 16
on the market that collect, analyze and summarize quality control data. Among most 
commonly applied tools for process control, we can list: data figures, Pareto analysis, 
cause-and-effect analysis, trend analysis, histograms, scatter diagrams, and process 
control charts. These statistics-based tools enable efficient collection of data, 
identification of patterns in data, and measurements of variability.16  
 
F. MATRIX ORGANIZATION 
The matrix management is widely used in both the civilian and military industry. 
The main reason for this is that a matrix organization attempts to obtain advantages from 
the functional structure and the product-driven structure. (Figure 3 and 4) 
Top 
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Personnel Division 2 Division 2 Accounting 
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Figure 4.   Typical Matrix Organization 
                                                 
16 H.Kerzner, Project Management, p. 1057-1058  
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As shown in Figure 4, the PM in the matrix organization retains direct authority 
only over permanent members of his project management office. Typically, the number 
of permanent (“full-time”) members of PMO is relatively small, perhaps from two to five 
people. Hence, the tiny “core” of the PMO is reinforced by matrix personnel, i.e., 
specialists “carved” from functional divisions of the organization (“part-time” members).  
A communication protocol in a matrix organization is based on both horizontal 
and vertical communication. Vertical communication generally dominates within 
functional divisions and horizontal communication plays a “key role” in project 
management offices.      
The most important advantages and disadvantages of a matrix organization are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Centralized project management Not clear “chain of command” 
Direct labor cost reduction because the 
same personnel can effectively participate 
in different projects 
PMs must coordinate manpower decisions 
with functional managers 
Horizontal communication enables quick 
responsiveness to environment uncertainty 
Possible conflicts of interests in  vertical 
and horizontal directions 
Different procedures can be established for 
each project 
 
No need to “look for a job” after 
completion of the project 
 
 




                                                 
17 Daft, Richard L, Essentials of Organizations – Theory and Design, p. 45-48 
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G.  INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAMS18  
The concept of integrated product teams (IPT) is based on organizing all project’s 
stakeholders into one product team.  
Members of the product team are multi-organizational as well as cross-
functional. This means that the ultimate user, contractors, suppliers, and 
the acquisition professional are organized into a product team.19  
R.M. Engelbeck distinguishes three types of integrated acquisition/product teams: 
overarching integrated product teams (OIPT), intermediate integrated product teams 
(IIPT) and working-level integrated product teams (WIPT). These three types of IPT and 
their interrelationships are depicted in Figure 5. 
 The OIPT is led by an authority at least one level above the PM and provides 
assistance, oversight and review through the acquisition process. It is also responsible for 
chartering the IIPT and the WIPT. 
The IIPT is responsible for coordinating of the efforts of the WIPT and handling 
issues assigned to another team.   
The WIPT is normally led by the PM who is responsible for executing of the 
acquisition process.20 
                                                 
18 The terms “Integrated Acquisition Teams” (IAT) and “Integrated Product 
Teams” (IPT) are often used interchangeably. In this project, I will consistently use the 
term IPT because this term was already introduced in Poland. 
19 R. M. Engelbeck,  Acquisition Management, p.43 
20 R. M. Engelbeck,  Acquisition Management, p.53-55 
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Figure 5.   The Three Types of Integrated Product Teams21 
 
 
H. ISO 15288 
ISO 15288 is an international standard that establishes a common framework for 
Systems Life Cycle Management. It defines associated terminology and characterizes the 
life-cycle processes for managing and performing the conception, development, 
production, utilization, support and retirement of systems.  
This International Standard defines the role of the project management not only in 
developing product and services within an organization but also in acquiring/supplying 
already fully-developed products/services on the market. 
 ISO 15288 recognizes the following processes of the project management: 
Planning Process, Assessment Process, Control Process, Decision Making Process, Risk 
Management Process and Configuration Management Process. It also provides the list of 
activities that acquirer and supplier should undertake during the acquisition and supply 
processes.  
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III. SHORT OVERVIEW OF PROJECT/PROGRAM 
MANAGEMENT IN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Acquisition of major warfighting systems in the U.S. is normally accomplished at 
the Service level: Army, Navy and Air Force. The Services practically execute the 
acquisition process and take full responsibility for the project/program management.  
However, major warfighting systems are often supervised by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) - specifically the Under-Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). 
The USD(AT&L) has the primary responsibility for establishing policies and 
procedures governing the operations of the DoD Acquisition System; supervising the 
performance of the DoD Acquisition System; coordinating research and development 
programs DoD-wide to eliminate duplication of effort; developing DoD-wide acquisition 
plans, strategies, guidance, and assessments; representing the U.S. at the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) and other multinational forums; and developing agreements 
with friendly and Allied Nations relating to acquisition matters.22 Additionally, the USD 
(AT&L) is the Milestone Decision Authority for those major warfighting programs 
designated for defense oversight. Moreover, guidance has recently been revised so that 
capability documents (indicating user requirements) are prepared jointly. Therefore, from 
capability to operational program reviews and program/project funds there is OSD 
oversight of the Services.  
 
B. PROJECT MANAGEMENT REPORTING RELATIONSHIP 
 Although project management in the U.S. remains in the responsibility of the 
Services, all branches have a common overall reporting relationship. The project 
management reporting relationship and overall organization of the U.S. DoD Acquisition 
System is illustrated in Figure 6. 
                                                 








































Acquisition reporting chain 
 
Figure 6.   The U.S. DoD Project Management Reporting Relationship 
 
As shown in Figure 6, for major programs that are designed for OSD oversight, 
there are only two levels of management between the PM and the USD(AT&L). 
Project managers in the U.S. DoD are appointed to acquire all major warfighting 
systems. Additionally, PMs can be appointed not only for acquisition of new systems but 
also for the modernization or overhauls of existing systems, e.g., aircraft carrier 
overhauls. PMs report to Program Executive Officers (PEO).  PEOs are responsible for 
particular warfighting systems, e.g., in the Air Force: PEO Tactical and Airlift Programs 
is responsible for all programs related to tactical and transportation aircraft; in the Navy: 
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PEO Submarines is responsible for all contracts related to submarines. PEOs report 
directly to Service Acquisition Executives (SAE). In the Navy, the service acquisition 
executive is the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & 
Acquisition (ASN(RD&A)); in the Army the service acquisition executive is the 
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics & Technology (ASA(AL&T); 
in the Air Force, the service acquisition executive is the Assistant Secretary of the Air 
Force for Acquisition (ASAFA). SAEs report to the Secretaries of the Services. Finally, 
Secretaries of the Services report directly to the Secretary of Defense. For acquisition 
matters, the SAEs report to the USD(AT&L). 
 
C. PROJECT MANAGER’S TASKS AND AUTHORITY 
The primary task of a project manager is to ensure that the project achieves 
specified up-front project goals.  
Typical duties of the project manager (…) include establishing program 
objectives; developing [user] requirements [into product](…); scheduling, 
estimating, budgeting, and controlling process; coordinating project 
planning with the contracting officer23.  
One of the main objectives for the PM is to mitigate risks associated with the 
project. 
The PM takes responsibility for the entire project. However, a direct authority PM 
retains only over members of his Project Management Office (PMO). In the case of other 
personnel involved in the project his authority is indirect. This comes from the fact that 
the PM must cooperate with different people and within different organizations during 
the life of the project. He must collaborate with final users during acquisition planning 
and evolution of the requirements; technical specialists during the composing of 
specifications; the contracting officer across all stages of the acquisition process; 
contractors in post-award phase, etc. Generally speaking, the PM very often does not 
have direct authority over the workforce assigned to the project. He must work through 
negotiations with functional supervisors of his team members. He must achieve a willing 
                                                 
23 R.M. Engelbeck, Acquisition Management, p.45 
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agreement to cooperate. Although the PM’s direct authority over members of his IPT is 
limited, in reality nobody wants to dispute him. There are two basic reasons: first, the PM 
controls the funds of the project, and second he has a powerful reporting chain-of-
command. Project management in the U.S. DoD is based on the Integrated Product 
Teams and matrix organization.  
The PM’s task is to discipline the acquisition process and establish a 
climate and a communication protocol that will ensure that the entire 
integrated product team works together.24 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Project management in the U.S. has worked successfully for a long time. The U.S. 
Department of Defense workforce has gotten much experience in managing not only 
sophisticated and expensive programs but also in managing small projects. PMs in the 
U.S. DoD are supported and controlled by many organizations, including the USD 
(AT&L), SAE, PEO, System Development Commands (SDC) and the Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA). The U.S. Acquisition Law and Regulations evolved to 
support U.S. acquisition. Similarly, Polish Procurement Law must be shaped to support 
Polish Defense Acquisition.  
However, there is no need to adopt all the American solutions to the Polish 
Armed Forces. Rather, the Polish system must be designed to work well for Poland. The 
PAF does not need to, for example, separate the acquisition processes for each Service. 
Maybe it would be more efficient to centralize and to consolidate the acquisition process 
in order to minimize administrative costs, obtain better control of the projects to avoid 
duplication of efforts, and finally to build a desirable level of integrity and transparency. 
It must be recognized that Poland allocates considerably less funds on national defense 
than the U.S does. For comparison, the U.S. DoD spends an average of $150 billion 
                                                 
24 R.M. Engelbeck Acquisition Management, p.46 
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annually on acquisition,25 while the whole modernization and restructuring of the Polish 
Armed Forces in the years 2002 to 2006 will cost no more that $22 billion.26 
On the other hand, individual projects, Polish and American, may be of similar 
size.  Hence, the acquisition workforce in Poland might benefit from some U.S. practices, 
such as project management. Matrix organizations and Integrated Product Teams that 
include multi-disciplinary cooperation could also be very beneficial in managing 




























                                                 
25 David M. Walker testimony before the Subcommittee on Readiness an 
Management Support, Committee on Armed Services, United Stated Senate, GAO-03-
573T 
26 The Act of May 25, 2001 on The Technical Restructuring and Modernization 
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IV. DISCUSSION OF PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR MAJOR 
SYSTEMS ACQUISITION IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Major warfighting systems acquisition in Poland is accomplished through 
cooperation of three state authorities: the legislative branch, the executive branch and the 
Polish Armed Forces (PAF). 
The Polish legislative branch that consists of the Sejm (the lower chamber) and 
Senate (the upper chamber) is involved in major systems acquisition in at least three 
ways. First, the legislature passes primary acts that settle public procurement procedures. 
Second, for all contracts with an estimated value exceeding PLN 100,000,000 ($24 M), 
special multi-year programs are established and passed in the legislature. Finally, for 
contracts below this threshold, the legislature passes or rejects the yearly MoND’s 
budget. 
The Polish executive branch is represented by the Council of Ministers and the 
President. The Council of Ministers effects major systems acquisition by assigning 
financial resources in the yearly budget. The President on the other hand can sign or veto 
yearly budgets. 
The Polish Armed Forces consist of the Ministry of National Defense (MoND) 
and three services: Land Forces, Navy and Air Forces. The MoND, based on inputs from 
the Services, shapes the direction of development of the Armed Forces, prepares and 
executes MoND’s yearly budget, and practically realizes the acquisition process.   
A discussion of the present procedures for major systems acquisition in the Polish 
Armed Forces requires two steps. The first step is to analyze Polish procurement law; the 





B. POLISH PROCUREMENT LAW AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE ACTS 
THAT SHAPE MAJOR SYSTEMS ACQUISITION FOR THE POLISH 
ARMED FORCES. 
Polish procurement law is based on two main legislative acts: the Act of June 10, 
1994 on Public Procurement and the Act of November 26, 1998 on Public Finance. These 
two primary acts are supplemented by several other legislative acts that more precisely 
settle selective procedures and policies that apply to federal procurement as a whole or 
that apply solely to MoND. The most important of them in the aspect of major systems 
acquisition are the Act of September 10, 1999 on Compensate (Offset) Agreements and 
the Act of May 25, 2001 on The Technical Restructuring and Modernization of the Polish 
Armed Forces in the years 2001 to 2006. 
1. The Act of June 10, 1994 on Public Procurement27 
The Act of June 10, 1994 on Public Procurement is the most important act for the 
Polish public procurement authorities. All public contracts of the value exceeding EUR 
3,000 must be awarded in accordance with this act. The general idea of the act is 
explained in its Article 1: 
This Act determines the principles, forms and procedures for awarding 
public procurement contracts, the appropriate organs of government in 
matters related to public procurement, and procedures for reviewing 
protests and appeals filed during the course of procurement proceedings. 
The act was based on the following principles of conducting public procurement: 
transparency of tendering procedures, fostering competition, economic use of means, 
equal treatment of tenderers, clear requirements for participation and clear contract award 
criteria.  
According to the Act, public contracts in Poland can be awarded under six 
following procedures: unlimited tendering, restricted tendering, two-stage tendering, 
negotiations while retaining competition, request-for-quotation or single-source 
procurement. These procedures are specified in the act as follow:  
 
 
                                                 
27 The Office of Public Procurement web site,  http://www.uzp.gov.pl/, August 2003 
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a. Unlimited Tendering  
Unlimited tendering is a primary procedure for awarding public contracts. 
Under this procedure proposals can be submitted by all contractors who wish to 
participate in tendering. 
b. Restricted Tendering 
Restricted tendering is a procedure in which tenders may be submitted 
only by the suppliers or contractors admitted to the participation in the tendering and 
invited by the procuring entity to submit tenders.  
This procedure may be applied only when the value of the contract does 
not exceed EUR 30,000 or the nature of the contract limits the number of contractors able 
to perform a given procurement. 
Others procedures for awarding public contracts can be applied only under 
special conditions specified in the act and are explained as follows. 
c. Two-Stage Tendering 
Two-stage tendering is a procedure in which the suppliers and contractors 
submit initial tenders in the first stage without specifying their price.(…) The second 
stage is limited to selected tenderers and may be preceded by the negotiations between 
the procuring entity and tenderers. 
d. Negotiations with Retaining Competition 
Negotiations with retaining competition is a procedure in which the 
procuring entity negotiates the terms of a public procurement contract with such a 
number of suppliers or contractors which is sufficient to ensure the selection of the best 
offer, competition and efficient proceedings, however, not less than three, unless due to 
the specialized nature of a procurement there are only two suppliers or contractors able 
to perform the procurement. 
e. Request for Quotation 
Request for quotation procedure may be used when procurement is for the 
supply of readily available goods or services of established quality standards, and the 
procurement value does not exceed the equivalent of EUR 130,000. 
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f. Single Source Procurement 
Single source procurement is a public procurement procedure in which the 
procuring entity awards a procurement contract after negotiating with only one supplier 
or contractor. 
However, the act also permits awarding contracts for armament or military 
equipment under special rules. The special rules may consist in renouncing of the 
provisions of the Act relating to the requirement of publication of notices, time limits, 
appeals, the requirement of approving a public procurement procedure other than 
unlimited tendering by the Chairman of the Office of Public Procurement, openness of 
proceedings, domestic preferences and premises for the application of restricted or two-
stage tendering.  
The Act of June 10, 1994 on Public Procurement also describes publicizing the 
requirement, responsibilities of the Office of Public Procurement and procedures for 
reviewing protests. Some of them will be mentioned in my analysis of the different stages 
of the acquisition process. 
2. The Act of November 26, 1998 on Public Finance 
The act defines concepts, policies and procedures related to public financial 
management. It specifies rules and principles of public financial audit, review, budget 
preparation, passage and execution, and finally specifies the penalties for violating those 
rules. It defines the organizational entities involved in public financial management and 
their primary responsibilities. The act also defines the concept of multi-year programs 
that can be established by the Council of Ministers and passed by legislature for contracts 
of the value exceeding PLN 100,000,000 ($24 M). An example of such a program is the 
Act of June 22, 2001 on establishment of a multi–year program to equip the Polish 
Armed Forces with a multi-functional fighter aircraft.  
3. The Act of September 10, 1999 on Compensate (Offset) Agreements 
The act established the requirement for foreign contractors that were awarded a 
contract for a warfighting system of the value exceeding EUR 5,000,000 to invest at least 
the same amount of money in the Polish industry. At least half of this investment should 
be made in the Polish military industry. The act specifies additionally that the contract for 
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a warfighting system becomes valid only when it is accompanied by the above-mentioned 
compensate (offset) agreement.  
4. The Act of May 25, 2001 on The Technical Restructuring and 
Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces in the Years 2001 to 2006. 
The act settles the main directions of the transformation and technological 
modernization of the Polish Armed Forces in the years 2001 to 2006 and defines the 
financial resources necessary to realize these tasks. It specifies several major weapon and 
communication systems that will be modified or replaced in that period. The main 
objective of this act is to enable one-third of the Polish Armed Forces to accomplish full 
interoperability with NATO members in the aspects of armament, mobility and capability 
to conduct warfare in every climatic and operational condition.  
 
C. ACQUISITION AND CONTRACTING PROCESSES IN THE POLISH 
ARMED FORCES28 
The acquisition process for major warfighting systems for the Polish Armed 
Forces consists of six main stages: Requirements Determination; Acquisition Planning; 
Feasibility Study;29 Product Development and Demonstration; Initial Production and 
Testing; and finally Serial Production. Although the overall organization of the 
acquisition process is very similar to the American model, many differences exist in the 
implementation of the process. A general overview of the acquisition process in the 
Polish Armed Forces, including authorities responsible for conducting the particular 
acquisition stage, is depicted in Figure 7. 
                                                 
28 This chapter was written based on an interview with 1Lt Marek FLIS former 
employee of the Armament Policy Department and the final report of The National 
Acquisition Strategy Team that visited Poland in the year 2000. 
29 Definitions of “Feasibility Study,” “Product Development” and “Serial Production” 
in regard to the acquisition process in the PAF were first used by the National 
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Figure 7.   Acquisition Process in the PAF  
 
1. Acquisition Process 
a. Requirements Determination 
Requirement determination begins in the Services: Land Forces, Air Force 
and Navy. The Services Commanders based on present needs and deficiencies prepare 
the statement of requirements for a new warfighting system. This statement of 
requirements, accompanied by adequate funds and the desired schedule, is forwarded 
through the Minister of National Defense to the General Staff (GS) P-5 (Strategic 
Planning Directorate) in order to verify if it complies with the National Military/Security 
Strategy. The P-5 makes a recommendation to the Minister of National Defense who 
makes the final decision and after approval forwards the statement of requirements to the 
Armament Policy Department (APD). The APD initiates the acquisition planning 
process.  The project funds are generally provided by the Services. However, the Services 
must include all acquisition expenditures in the yearly budget proposal for the incoming 
fiscal year that is forwarded to the Budget Department. The Budget Department (BD) 
based on the present needs and financial resources of the MoND, approves or rejects the 
acquisition expenditures.  The only exceptions to this procedure are multi-year programs. 
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Multi-year programs’ funds are appropriated by the legislature and are approved on the 
yearly basis by the Council of Ministers.   
b. Acquisition Planning 
The acquisition planning process takes place entirely in the APD. It 
consists of two main stages: market research and development of specifications. Market 
research is conducted by the APD or can be outsourced. Based on market research and 
specification analysis, the Director of the APD makes a final determination whether the 
warfighting system must be developed from the beginning or if a ready product (that is, 
commercial or non-developmental) can be acquired in the military/civilian market. 
c. Feasibility Study 
If the product can be acquired on the market, then the whole acquisition 
process is immediately transferred to the Procurement Department (PD), which continues 
the acquisition process and activates serial production. If the product must be developed, 
then the APD begins a Feasibility Study. The Feasibility Study encompasses 
development of models and prototypes. It is conducted to be assured that there are 
capabilities in the market to build a warfighting system that fulfills the user’s 
requirements.  
d. Product Development & Demonstration 
After successfully completing the Feasibility Study, the APD initiates a 
Product Development stage. The Product Development stage consists of research and 
development and component-advanced development. During this stage, the final product 
must be developed and demonstrated to the APD.  
e. Initial Production and Testing 
When the final product is developed, the Director of the APD makes a 
decision to begin low-rate initial production. The trial-batch is forwarded to the APD, 
which conducts product testing in military technological institutes and coordinates 
product testing by the final users. If the product meets all the user’s requirements, safety 
precautions, generally all the product specifications, the Director of the APD decides to 
initiate serial production and transfers the warfighting system to the PD.  
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f. Serial Production 
Serial Production is supervised by the Procurement Department. The PD 
becomes the link between the final users and contractor during the whole production, and 
operating and maintenance phases. The PD supervises the delivery of the system to the 
users, arranges spare parts supply and conducts quality control.  
2. Contracting Process 
The contracting process in the PAF consists of the following stages: Development 
of Specifications, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Award and Contract 
Administration. A general overview of the contracting process in the Polish Armed 
Forces including authorities responsible for conducting particular contracting stage is 
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Figure 8.   Contracting Process in the PAF 
 
As shown in Figure 8 the APD conducts contracting activities for the R&D, the 
Feasibility Study and the Product Development. The PD, on the other hand, conducts 
contracting activities for all commercial or non-developmental products that are available 
in the market and contracting activities associated with serial production. All contracting 
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phases such as solicitation, source selection, contract award and contract administration 
are accomplished in the same way and according to the same law and regulations. 
a. Development of Specifications  
Specifications, as mentioned earlier, are developed by the APD. The APD 
is responsible that all final users’ requirements are properly addressed in the product 
specifications. Technological expertise during the development of specifications is 
provided by the PAF technological institutes and military educational centers such as the 
Military University of Technology or the Military School of Communications Systems.   
b. Solicitation 
The solicitation process is conducted according to procedures specified in 
The Act of June 10, 1994 on Public Procurement. The act specifies that all contracts of 
estimated value above EUR 30,000 must be displayed in public places and on the 
website, they must be published in the Bulletin of the Office of Public Procurement, and 
they might be published in the press. Additionally, all contracts of estimated value above 
EUR 130,000 must be published in the Official Journal of European Communities.   
Although the primary procedure for the award of public contracts is 
unlimited tendering, most of the contracts for major warfighting systems are expected to 
be awarded under restricted tendering or single-source procurement. The procuring 
entities may award a procurement contract under a procedure other than unlimited 
tendering, exclusively under the circumstances specified in the Act. Additionally, all the 
applications of a procedure other than unlimited tendering for public procurements of the 
value exceeding EUR 200,000 shall be subject to consent by the Chairman of the Office 
of Public Procurement. 
c. Source Selection 
The main principle of source selection is precisely articulated in article 16 
of the act in the following words: a procuring entity is obligated to treat all competitors 
applying for a public procurement on equal terms and to conduct procurement 
proceedings in a manner that ensures fair competition. 
Source selection is conducted by the tendering committee, which can be of 
a permanent nature or can be appointed to conduct particular proceedings. The committee 
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is responsible for the opening of tenders, fair evaluation of tenders, exclusion of tenders 
that do not fulfill specifications and finally fair selection of the most advantageous tender. 
Polish procurement law and regulations do not require from the procurement authority to 
prepare a source selection plan. However, the U.S. experience in that area shows that a 
precise source selection plan and process structure could provide many benefits during 
this stage.  
d. Contract Award 
The best offer is selected based solely on the offer evaluation criteria set 
forth in the specification of the contract. Evaluation criteria can encompass: price, 
technical parameters, functional value and completion date. Each of these criteria has 
assigned percentage value. Contracts are awarded taking into account domestic 
preferences. Domestic suppliers’ final price is reduced by 20%. Additionally there is a 
requirement that the value of domestic raw materials is not lower than 50% of the total 
value of the contract. In order to minimize corruption during the contract award process 
the subjective evaluation criteria of contractors such as past performance, financial 
situation, or management are not taken into consideration. 
e. Contract Administration  
Contract administration is conducted solely by the PD. Unfortunately this 
is the weakest stage of the Polish acquisition process. Polish procurement law does not 
specify any contract administration requirements. All contract modifications, contractor 
surveillance or contract closeouts are accomplished in accordance with commercial law.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Polish Armed Forces have undergone major transformation since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Serious reduction of the Armed 
Forces has been accompanied by technical restructuring and modernization of several 
major weapon systems that must meet the new and rigorous standards of NATO. 
Successful and effective management of the acquisition of these major systems seems to 
be crucial to supply and to support the transformation of the Polish Armed Forces.  
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However, there is no centralized management across all phases of the acquisition 
and contracting processes in Poland at the moment. Different military and civilian 
authorities dominate different phases of the processes. There is an urgent need to 
implement project management strategy in order to consolidate the efforts of all the 
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V. DISCUSSION OF COSTS & BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH 
IMPLEMENTING PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN THE POLISH 
ARMED FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Implementing a fundamental change in doing business always requires certain up-
front costs. These costs could be tangible and intangible. For example tangible costs are 
investment in Information Technology (IT) to better manage inventory or hiring 
additional workforce. Intangible costs could be confusions and misunderstandings caused 
by structural reorganization.  
People generally oppose change. They subconsciously pursue the status quo. They 
are afraid that the change will deprive them of work, or will require additional skills and 
knowledge, or more specifically will threaten their present position in the organization. 
The change also requires time. Sometimes even a year or more must pass before the 
benefits of the change will outstrip its costs.  
There are unfavorable circumstances to reorganizing the acquisition process in the 
PAF at the moment. The Act of May 25, 2001 on the Technical Restructuring and 
Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces in the years 2001 to 2006 requires that the 
number of soldiers be decreased by 25% by the end of 2003. Fifty thousand soldiers have 
already lost or will lose their careers in that period. The MoND has a reluctant attitude to 
all new ideas that increase instead of reduce the number of personnel in the PAF at the 
moment. 
However, the PAF procurement system requires transparency and integrity. 
Recent procurement projects such as the multi-year program to equip the Air Forces (AF) 
with a multi-functional fighter aircraft or the project to equip the Land Forces (LF) with 
the Armored Personnel Carrier have caused many controversies and much speculation in 
the mass media. Additionally, three high ranking officers from the Command of the Land 
Forces were recently accused of dishonest dealings during the solicitation and contract 
award of four projects.  The PAF must rebuild its credibility in the eyes of the taxpayers. 
 40
This chapter illustrates that the benefits of implementing of project management 
will outstrip the costs in the future. This chapter also answers the following question: 
Why should the PAF implement the Project Management Policy? 
 
B. COSTS 
There are certainly some costs associated with implementing the project 
management policy. These costs can be divided into tangible and intangible costs. 
Among, the tangible costs, we can list management costs and educational and training 
costs. Among, intangible costs, we can list a blurred chain-of-command and reporting 
system, possible fractures between PMs and functional chiefs, and confusion and 
misunderstandings caused by fundamental changes in doing business. 
1. Management Costs 
Management costs would be associated with the slightly increased number of 
personnel, the necessity of renting new offices and equipping them with appropriate 
hardware and software.   
2. Educational and Training Costs 
Educational and training costs would consist of training project managers and 
PMO members. In the initial period, the expense would entail the cost of sending the 
workforce for education and training to the U.S. In the subsequent period, it would be the 
cost of establishing education and training courses in Poland.   
3. A Blurred Chain-of-Command and Reporting System 
Project management offices’ members would be forced to work for “two bosses.” 
In essence, they would be subordinate to their functional bosses, and would also report to 
project managers. As a matter-of-fact, employees in the PAF are evaluated by their 
functional supervisors on a yearly basis. That would provide incentives for the employees 
to give higher priority for tasks received from the functional supervisors than from the 
project managers. However, there are two simple solutions that could mitigate this 
disadvantage. First is securing the right for project managers to provide comments to the 
yearly evaluation report of the employee. Second is establishing financial incentives for 
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effective participation in the projects, e.g., as a percentage of the monthly salary. This 
financial incentive would lie in the project manager’s hands.  
4. Possible Fractures between PMs and Functional Chiefs 
There could be potential fractures between PMs and functional chiefs. These 
would result from different priorities for the PMs and the functional chiefs. The priority 
for the functional chiefs is always the work inside his department. The priority for the 
project manager is his project. These priorities could sometimes be contradictory.  
5. Fundamental Change in Doing Business  
The fundamental change in doing business could cause confusion and 
misunderstandings, especially in the beginning of the transformation. Contractors, for 
example could be confused about who prepares specifications, who is responsible for 
solicitation, and who is the appropriate point of contact. This confusion could negatively 
impact the transparency and responsiveness of the system, as well as communication 
between procuring authorities and suppliers. 
    
C. BENEFITS 
The benefits associated with implementing of the project management policy are 
generally intangible.  Some of the benefits would be visible from the beginning while 
others would require more time to prove their real value. 
1. Mitigation of “Tragedy of Common” 
One of the most important benefits of the project management is mitigation of the 
phenomenon of “tragedy of common.” 
 The “tragedy of common” is a term widely used in the economics to describe 
people who care more about their own resources, tasks or businesses than commonly 
owned ones. The Twentieth Century, using vivid example of socialistic countries, 
forcibly proved that private management of the business is much more effective than 
common management. Because there is no centralized management of the acquisition 
process in the PAF at the moment, the major systems acquisition seems to be “commonly 
owned.” 
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Any procurement authority in the Polish MoND is responsible for the entire major 
system acquisition.  
Additionally another important factor associated with the “tragedy of common” is 
shared responsibility. A person who is solely responsible for a particular task cares about 
it much more than a person who is only a member of the group responsible for the same 
task. The reason is that in a group you can always try to transfer responsibility to another 
person saying: “It is not my job” or “This is his responsibility, not mine.” 
When you are the only person responsible for a particular task, you derive full 
benefits of it, but you are also responsible for all its misfortunes. The project manager 
should become the authority that gathers responsibility for major systems acquisition into 
his hands.  
2. Increased Transparency and Integrity 
The Project Manager would act as the representative of his project. He would 
become the first and most important point of contact for every aspect of the project.  He 
would always be up-to-date with progress of the project because every matter related to it 
would be within his area of responsibility. The PM would ensure transparency of the 
project through efficient information exchange between all stakeholders and mass media. 
He would also ensure that that all phases of the acquisition process are conducted in the 
light of integrity and fairness, and according to present procurement procedures and law. 
3. Centralized Decision-Making (Better Executive Control) 
The project manager would ensure a centralized authority. As described in 
Chapter IV, the acquisition system in the PAF is highly fragmented at the moment. 
Different stakeholders dominate in different phases of the acquisition system. The PM 
would consolidate the efforts of these different branches and secure successful 
accomplishment of his project goals. He would be the authority that sets project 
milestones, supervises progress of the project, and makes all important decisions related 
to the project. He would be the only person that supervises the project from the beginning 
to the end and ensures efficient executive control across all phases of the acquisition 
process. However, the centralization should not go too far. Centralized planning and 
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authority with decentralized execution by an empowered workforce can provide amazing 
results. 
Moreover, in order to be effective, the PM must control the funds of the project 
and have authority to select his PMO members. He must be experienced, well educated 
and devoted to his project.  
4. Streamlined Acquisition Process 
The PM would streamline the acquisition process. He would facilitate a quick 
information exchange between the stakeholders and stimulate progress of his project. The 
PM would be also responsible for managing the schedule of his project, including 
critical-path determination and analysis.    
5. Better Communication and Coordination Between Stakeholders 
Stakeholders could have different opinions about the particular aspect of the 
project. These opinions could be opposing but very often each of them could provide 
some important insights. The PM would be the authority who facilitates the 
communication and coordination between the stakeholders. He would organize and 
conduct the stakeholders’ meetings on a regular basis and derive benefits from such 
tactics as brainstorming and teamwork.  
Appropriate communication protocol between project stakeholders would reduce 
revisions, increase responsiveness to project changes and uncertainties, ensure better 
understanding of roles and responsibilities, and establish long-term relationships with 
contractors. 
6. Proactive vs. Reactive Approach 
A reactive approach dominates in major systems acquisition for the PAF, at the 
moment. Procurement authorities seem to focus on countermeasures to the existing 
problems instead of focusing on planning, forecasts and predictions. The PM would be 
responsible for maintaining a proactive approach in major systems acquisition. He would 
focus on precise planning, forecasting and constantly analyzing his project’s 




7. Efficient Acquisition Planning   
Acquisition planning for major systems acquisition in the PAF is realized by the 
APD. However, market research that is conducted in the department focuses on the 
market surveillance. Market investigation is conducted sporadically and most often is 
outsourced. After implementing of the project management, market research and 
especially market investigation would lie in the hands of the project manager.    
The PM would also supervise the development of specifications. He would be 
responsible for close cooperation with the final users and the General Staff and make sure 
that all users’ requirements are appropriately addressed in the specifications.  
Additionally, during the acquisition planning, the PM would conduct the 
stakeholders’ analysis that presently seems to be underestimated and neglected by the 
procurement authorities. During this analysis, he must link the projects goals and 
objectives to the stakeholders’ needs. Finally, during acquisition planning, the PM would 
secure an effective cascade of objectives by establishing clear stakeholders’ 
responsibilities, determining the project’s milestones and performance metrics, estimating 
the project life-cycle costs, and developing of a realistic project schedule.  
8. Better Funds Control and Allocation of Resources 
The PM should control his project funds in order to be effective. He should 
actively cooperate with the Services and the Budget Department during the funding 
process, provide cost estimation and conduct life-cycle costs analysis. The PM would be 
accountable to the parliament, the BD and final users for his project funds. Being always 
up-to-date with project needs, the PM would ensure better funds control and allocation of 
resources.      
9. Life-Cycle Cost Savings 
The PM would be responsible for life-cycle cost analysis. Initially, during the 
acquisition planning, the PM would analyze his project life-cycle costs, taking into 
consideration the available funds. Through market investigation, he would explore best 
technology and best practices in the market and in the area of logistic support, assess the 
costs of all life-cycle phases of his project including system disposal, and provide 
recommendations to the final users. Afterward, during the source selection, the PM 
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would compare and assess the contractors’ proposals in order to maximize life-cycle cost 
savings.         
10. Risk Mitigation 
Risk mitigation would be one of the most important benefits of implementing a 
project management policy in the PAF. Risk management would be planned, assessed 
and prioritized from the beginning of the acquisition process.  The PM would be 
responsible for choosing appropriate risk countermeasures and risk handling techniques. 
He would also conduct constant risk monitoring and risk documenting.  
11. Improved Total Quality Management 
Implementing a project management policy in the PAF would improve the total 
quality management. Project managers would ensure the final users’ satisfaction and the 
different stakeholders’ involvement. He would continue improvements of the acquisition 
process, long-term relationships with suppliers, and constant quality control by 
comparing a project’s outcomes with performance measures. 
12. Improved Documentation and New Database Systems  
The project manager would be responsible for accurately documenting of his 
project, including preparation and submission of the project’s reports, and maintaining a 
contractors’ performance evaluation and lessons-learned database systems. 
13. Conformity with ISO 15288 
Implementation of the project management policy in the PAF would enable 
conformity of the acquisition system in the Polish MoND with ISO 15288. This 
International Standard, as mentioned in Chapter II, characterizes life-cycle processes for 
managing and performing the conception, development, production, utilization, support 
and retirement of systems. The standard already has been put into practice by many 
civilian and federal organizations. The Polish Armed Forces must eventually implement 
the standard within its own organizations. Presently the standard may be considered an 





D. SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS 
Most important costs and benefits associated with implementing a project 
management policy in the PAF are summarized in Table 2.  
Costs Benefits 
Slightly increased management costs Mitigation of “tragedy of common” 
Educational & Training costs Increased transparency and integrity 
Unclear chain-of-command and reporting 
system 
Centralized decision making (better 
executive control) 
Possible fractures between PMs and 
functional chiefs 
Streamlined acquisition process 
Confusion and misunderstandings caused 
by fundamental change in doing business 
Better communication and coordination 
between stakeholders 
 Proactive vs. Reactive approach 
 Efficient acquisition planning 
 Better funds control and allocation of 
resources 
 Life cycle cost savings 
 Risk mitigation 
 Improved Total Quality Management 
 Improved documentation and new database 
systems 
 Conformity with ISO 15288 
 




Discussion of costs and benefits associated with implementing the project 
management policy in the PAF showed that benefits would outstrip costs. Although the 
implementing of the policy would require some costs associated with training the 
workforce, I recommend implementing project management policy. The PAF requires a 
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transparent and integrated acquisition system. The public is interested in the way the 
major warfighting systems are acquired. A project management policy would help rebuild 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES FOR THE 
POLISH ARMED FORCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The discussion of the present procedures for major systems acquisition that was 
discussed in Chapter IV indicated that the acquisition process in the Polish Armed Forces 
is highly fragmented. Different civilian and military authorities dominate different stages 
of the acquisition process. Determining requirements begins in the Services; 
specifications are created within the Armament Policy Department; financial resources 
are determined through cooperation of the Services, the Budget Department, the Council 
of Ministers and legislature; acquisition planning is conducted entirely within the APD 
and finally procurement functions and contract administration are the responsibility of the 
Procurement Department. There is an urgent need to establish an authority that would 
consolidate the efforts of all the people who work on each project. This authority would 
ensure a successful achievement of the project’s goals and the most effective use of 
public funds. Such an authority is the project manager. 
There are many possible alternatives for establishing project management 
structures in Poland. Depending of the size of the project, different policies would govern 
placement within the MoND or Office of Public Procurement, the number of personnel 
that would be involved, the PMO members’ job descriptions or specialties, and whether 
personnel would be “full-time” or “part-time” PMO members. 
Based on the review of the American model (Chapter III), the discussion of the 
present procurement procedures in the PAF (Chapter IV) and the interviews with 
members of National Acquisition Strategy Team (NAST) from NPS who visited Poland 
in the year 2000, I propose three possible alternatives for establishing project 





B. ALTERNATIVE I - LEAD ROLE OF ARMAMENT POLICY 
DEPARTMENT 
The NAST proposed implementation of project management policy on the 
strength of the APD. This solution suggests establishing project management structures 
based on the present workforce and organization of the APD. According to NAST’s 
proposal, the Director of the APD would appoint a PM who, in turn, would choose his 
team members, taking into consideration technical skills, experience and ability to work 
cooperatively.30 However, the PM would be obligated to coordinate his personnel choices 
with functional chiefs of the department’s divisions.  
Project management offices would consist of 5 to 15 members - mostly 
technicians, plus financial manager, logistician, planner and others as necessary. Because 
the main goal of this solution is implementing a project management policy without 
significantly increasing the number of personnel in the department, PMO members would 
have to be “carved” from the present workforce. The only new person would be the 
project manager.31 
While working in a PMO, members would work for “two bosses,” and the PM 
would have to depend on the matrix organization. Team members would have to work in 
two directions or “planes”: vertical - within functional divisions and horizontal - within 
the PMO.  Horizontal communication within the APD would be a key to success in 
projects management. The PM would need to ensure a good climate and communication 
protocol within his team in order to achieve the full benefit of “teamwork”.  
Under this alternative, PMO members would report to both their functional chief 
and the project manager. The PM would report to the Director of the APD who, in turn, 
would report to the Secretary of State. Finally, the Secretary of State would report 
directly to the Minister of National Defense. 
The chain-of-command and overall organization of the project management 
organization is depicted in Figure 9.  
                                                 
30 Proposed Blueprint for Polish National Acquisition Strategy, 01/22/03, p.12 



































Figure 9.   Project Management in the APD 
 
I suggest that project management policy under this alternative only fits R&D 
projects and “feasibility studies,” unless the responsibilities of the APD change. The main 
reason is that only these projects are initiated, conducted and closed within the APD. In 
case of projects that include serial production or purchase fully-developed products, the 
acquisition process is forwarded to the Procurement Department. It would be difficult for 
the PM subordinated to the Director of the APD to retain authority over the workforce of 
the PD.  
I suggest that this solution be implemented rather as “a test of effectiveness” of 
the project management policy in the PAF. It should be applied initially only to two or 
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three of the most challenging projects. Afterward, based on the lessons learned from this 
alternative, “higher structures” should be established in the MoND. 
 
C. ALTERNATIVE II - ESTABLISHMENT OF A BUREAU OF PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT UNDER THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
The discussion of the present procurement procedures in Chapter IV showed that 
three departments under the Secretary of State actively participate in the acquisition 
process: the APD, the PD and the BD. In order to effectively consolidate efforts of these 
departments, a “higher” or at least “equal” authority should be established. Under 
Alternative II, a Bureau of Project Management (BPM) would be established under the 
Secretary of State.  
The bureau initially would be responsible for directly managing two or three 
projects for major warfighting systems. If the policy of project management proves to be 
effective, the bureau will manage all future major systems acquisitions. 
The BPM initially would be very small 7 to 10 persons. Moreover, the structure of 
the bureau would be rather changeable and vary with the number of projects. The only 
permanent position would be the Director of the Bureau of Project Management 
(DBPM). 
The DBPM would report directly to the Secretary of State. His position should be 
on the same level as the directors of the APD, the BD and the PD. Project managers 
would report directly to the DBPM. 
The project manager would have the authority to select two permanent members 
of his PMO. One of them should be a planner/coordinator; the second one, depending on 
the projects, could be a technician, logistician or other specialty as necessary. The rest of 
the members of the PMO would be “carved” from different departments of the MoND or 
General Staff. 
The PM, as in Alternative I, would depend on the matrix organization. The main 
difference is that in Alternative II, horizontal communication would be conducted across 
all organizations of the MoND.  
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PMs would take full responsibility for their projects. They would monitor and 
control by cooperating with the GS for conformity of the projects with the National 
Defense Strategy; the BD and the Services regarding project funding; final users for 
requirements generation; the APD for development of specifications, R&D and the 
feasibility study; the PD for the final procurement functions, serial production and 
contract administration.  
Organization of the MoND with the BPM is depicted in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.   Bureau of PM under the Secretary of State 
 
D. ALTERNATIVE III -   ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU OF PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CHAIRMAN OF THE OFFICE OF 
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 
Alternatives I and II assumed incorporation of project management structures into 
the structures of the Polish Armed Forces. However, there is also the possibility to 
implement the project management policy in the PAF through the Office of Public 
Procurement.  
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Alternative III assumes establishment of the Bureau of Project Management under 
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Figure 11.   Bureau of PM under the Office of Public Procurement 
 
The main idea of this alternative is to apply the project management policy 
initially only to multi-year programs passed by the Polish Legislature. The concept of the 
multi-years programs was described in Chapter IV. Generally speaking, project managers 
would be appointed initially only for projects exceeding PLN 100,000,000 ($24 M). An 
example of such a project is the Act of June 22, 2001 on establishing a multi–year 
program to equip the Polish Armed Forces in multi-functional fighter aircraft.  
Under this alternative, PMs for all projects that concern the PAF would be 
appointed by the Minister of National Defense but would report directly to the Director of 
the Office of Public Procurement. PMs would have authority to select their permanent 
PMO members not only from military personnel but also civilians. This flexibility would 
be very important because the PMs could hire specialists from the civilian market who 
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have experience not available in the military, e.g., contracting or market research 
specialists. However the core of the PMOs would still consist of specialists drawn from 
the APD, the BD, and the PD. The size of the PMOs under this alternative should be 
larger than under Alternatives I and II, mainly due to the higher value and importance of 
the projects. I assume 10 to 15 people, depending on the project. Among other 
advantages of this solution (from the MoND standpoint) are that administrative costs will 
be shifted outside the MoND; the most expensive programs would be managed by a 
professional military and civilian workforce; the relatively higher PM positions in the 
executive hierarchy of Poland could enable better funds control (The Chairman of the 
Office of Public Procurement reports directly to the Prime Minister).        
Among disadvantages of this alternative are that due to the rarity of multi-year 
programs, most of the acquisitions for the PAF would be conducted without project 
management; the Minister of National Defense would have less control over the PMs 
who would report directly to DOPP; civilian specialists might have no military 
experience. However, the principal disadvantage is the likelihood that such an 




My recommendation is to establish project management structures by combining 
Alternatives I and II. As a “test of effectiveness,” I suggest applying the project 
management policy to all R&D projects conducted within the APD as described in 
Alternative I. Following that, based on the lessons learned from the test, I suggest 
establishing of the Bureau of Project Management under the Secretary of State as 
described in Alternative II. 
I recommend implementing Alternative III only if there is no possibility to 
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VII. DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are at least two ways of implementing project management policy in the 
PAF. The first way might be characterized as the “revolutionary method.” It would 
consist of the following steps: quickly establishing project management structures within 
the MoND; appointing “part-time” project managers and PMO members to major 
projects that are already initiated; appointing “full-time” project managers and PMO 
members to all new projects for major warfighting systems. 
The second way is an evolutionary method. This method would encompass the 
following: educational preparation of future “full-time” project managers; testing PM 
policy in one or two R&D projects; based on lessons learned, establishing PM structures 
within the MoND and finally applying PM policy to all new major warfighting systems. 
This chapter will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of both methods and 
provide a recommendation.  
 
B. REVOLUTIONARY METHOD (1 TO 2 YEARS) 
There is a need to implement project management policy quickly because a 
transformation of the Polish Armed Forces has already begun. The Act of May 25, 2001 
on the Technical Restructuring and Modernization of the Polish Armed Forces in the 
Years 2001 to 2006 identifies several major weapon and communication systems that will 
be modified or replaced in that period. Many acquisition processes have already been 
initiated or will be initiated in the near future. If the MoND wants to derive benefits from 
the project management policy, it must take decisive steps.  
This method would consist of the following phases: 
1. Establishing PM Structures within the MoND  
The Minister of National Defense should establish a Bureau of Project 
Management under the Secretary of State as described in Chapter VI. The bureau would 
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be responsible for directly managing all new projects for major warfighting systems and 
supervising projects already initiated. 
2. Managing Projects Already Initiated  
Projects that have already been initiated would be managed by “part-time” project 
managers. These managers would be appointed within the Armament Policy Department 
or the Procurement Department, depending on the project’s stage. If the project is in the 
stage of preparing specifications or it is entirely for R&D, then the PM should be 
appointed from within the APD. If the project is already in the serial production stage or 
contract administration stage, then the PM should be appointed from within the PD.  
3. Managing New Projects 
Every new project for major warfighting system should be managed by a “full-
time” PM. Project managers would be responsible for monitoring all aspects of the 
project, beginning with requirement generation, developmental activities, acquisition 
planning, through source selection, and ending with contract award and contract 
administration. They would select permanent PM office members. 
4. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Partially centralized management of 
projects already initiated  
“Part-time” managers might have to work 
for “two bosses” 
Effective management of modernizing the 
Polish Armed Forces 
No time to complete appropriate 
educational preparation of PM workforce 
Fully centralized management of all new 
projects 
Sudden fundamental change could cause 
serious problems “down the road” 
 
Table 3.   Advantages and Disadvantages of the Revolutionary Method 
 
 
C. EVOLUTIONARY METHOD (3 TO 5 YEARS)  
Implementing project management policy under this method requires more time. 
The time is required first for educational preparation of future Project Managers and their 
staff and second to test the effectiveness of the project management policy in the Polish 
MoND. Implementation under this method would consist of the following phases: 
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1. Educational Preparation of Future “Full-Time” Project Managers 
and PMO Members 
Educational preparation of PMs and their staff could be originally conducted in 
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey in the U.S. or be conducted in Warsaw. 
Project mangers could take a series of courses on project management, and PM office 
members could take short courses on Systems Acquisition Management (SAM), 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD), logistics, and other such areas. 32 
2. Test of Effectiveness of the PM Strategy in the Polish Armed Forces 
Before the PM strategy is applied MoND-wide to all major warfighting systems, 
it should be tested initially in one or two projects. During this period well educated and 
prepared PMs supported by professional staff would need to prove the benefits associated 
with the project management policy. As a test of effectiveness, I would suggest 
implementing the policy in the APD only to R&D or “feasibility studies” projects. (See 
Alternative I, Chapter VI) 
3. Establishment of PM Structures within the MoND  
Based on experience and lessons learned from the previous phase, an appropriate 
structure should be incorporated within the MoND. I recommend establishing the Bureau 
of Project Management under the Secretary of State as described in Chapter VI.  
4. Training Programs 
If project management effectiveness is implemented, the appropriate training 
programs could be activated, for example, in The Military University of Technology or in 
The Academy of National Defense in Warsaw. 
5. Gradual Implementation of PM Strategy to All New Major 
Warfighting Systems 
When appropriate structures are established in the MoND and a well-trained 
project management workforce is available, the policy can be applied to all new major 
warfighting systems. 
 
                                                 
32 These courses were first proposed by NAST, which visited Poland in the year 
2000, but implementing such training effort would need to be arranged through direct 
negotiations with the U.S. DoD. 
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6. Advantages and Disadvantages 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Appropriate educational preparation of PM 
workforce 
No centralized management of already 
initiated projects 
Smooth implementation of fundamental 
change  
Modernization of the PAF would be 
completed according to “old” principles 
Structures developed based on experience 
and lessons learned 
 




Table 4.   Advantages and Disadvantages of the Evolutionary Method 
 
D. RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the above analysis, I recommend implementing project management 
policy through the evolutionary method. Effective management of acquisition processes 
requires appropriate preparation of the workforce, well thought out organization of the 
PM organizational structure, supportive internal and external structures, clear job 
descriptions and responsibilities. Possible missteps in the beginning of the process could 
discourage personnel in the MoND from accepting the whole policy. Applying the policy 
initially to only one or two programs would mitigate the risk associated with this 
fundamental change, provide valuable lessons learned, and finally smooth the 
implementation of the project management in future projects.  
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Project management policy has continuously gained in importance and acceptance 
in military and civilian environments for the last several decades.  The policy is widely 
used in civilian and military industry across the whole world. Courses on project 
management are offered by many colleges and universities in the United States. Project 
management has proved its effectiveness in many sophisticated and challenging projects.  
Poland has been undergoing enormous transformation since the end of the 
socialistic era. This transformation also includes the PAF. The majority of the 
warfighting systems will be replaced or modernized in the near future. However, the 
acquisition process in the PAF is highly fragmented at the moment. Different 
procurement authorities dominate different acquisition stages. Implementing project 
management policy is essential to effectively manage acquisitions in the PAF. 
The costs and benefits discussion in Chapter V concluded that benefits associated 
with implementing project management policy in the PAF would outstrip the costs. The 
most important benefits would be the encouragement of integrity and transparency of the 
procurement system, streamlining of the acquisition process, centralized decision-
making, better communication between the stakeholders, mitigation of projects’ risk, life-
cycle cost savings, and improved total quality management. Costs on the other hand 
would be mainly associated with educational preparation of workforce and slightly 
increased management costs. Through improved organization and efficiency, project 
management might more than pay for itself. 
Project management is usually dependent on the matrix organization, both in the 
military and civilian sectors. Horizontal communication is a “key” to success for two 
reasons: first, it does not require additional administrative and labor expense, and second, 
it increases effectiveness through improved communications and intensive management. 
The Polish Armed Forces workforce must adopt the ability to work in a matrix 
organization, to be successful in the 21st century. People must learn how to work for “two 
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bosses” (product-oriented and functional) and fully benefit from such tactics as 
“teamwork” and “brainstorming.” 
I recommend implementing of the project management policy through the 
“evolutionary method” described in Chapter VII. This method requires time mainly to 
educate personnel and the policy “test of effectiveness,” but also significantly mitigates 
the risk associated with “fundamental and cultural changes” in business practices. As a 
“test of effectiveness,” I suggest applying the project management policy to all R&D 
projects conducted within the APD, as described in Alternative I in Chapter VI. After 
this, based on the lessons learned from the test, I suggest establishing the Bureau of 
Project Management under the Secretary of State, as described in Alternative II in 
Chapter VI. 
Appendix A to this report describes a recommended step-by-step plan of 
implementing project management policy in the PAF. This plan was based on John P. 
Kotter’s article, Why Transformation Efforts Fail, published in Harvard Business School 
Press, March-Aril 1995. Appendix B is an example of a project manager’s job 
description, or charter. Appendix C provides ten tips for project managers that were 
expressed by Mr. Skip Hawthorne during his seminar lecture at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in August, 2003. 
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APPENDIX A – EIGHT STEPS TO IMPLEMENTING PROJECT 
MANAGEMENT POLICY IN THE POLISH ARMED FORCES33 
1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency 
Initiators of the project management must establish a sense of urgency in the 
Polish MoND. Decision-making authorities, such as the Minister of National Defense and 
the Secretary of State, must be convinced that the project management policy is the only 
right choice and that it must be implemented quickly in order to improve the 
transparency, integrity and fairness of the acquisition system in the PAF. 
2. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition 
A powerful guiding coalition could consist of the directors of the APD and the 
PD, the Secretary of State and the Minister of National Defense. Additionally, the 
supportive attitude of the Director of BD, the Services and the Chairman of the Office of 
Public Procurement would be very desirable. 
3. Creating a Vision 
The guiding coalition should craft the vision of the acquisition system in the PAF. 
The vision should set the directions toward which major systems acquisition in the PAF 
needs to move. It should express the procuring authorities’ dream - it should stretch the 
imagination and motivate the MoND employees to rethink what is possible.34 
4. Communicating the Vision 
The vision should be communicated across all procuring authorities in the MoND. 
Each of the potential stakeholders in the major systems acquisition should be briefed and 
familiarized with the concept of the project management, the costs and benefits 
associated with implementing the policy and his future responsibilities.   
 
                                                 
33 This plan was based on John P. Kotter article Why Transformation Efforts Fail 
published in Harvard Business School Press, March-Aril 1995. 
34 Belgard, Fisher, Rayner Vision, Opportunity, and Tenacity: Three Informal 
Processes That Influence Transformation, p. 135, 1988 
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5. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision 
The MoND employees should be empowered to act on the vision. Incentives 
should be established for the employees of the APD, the PD and the BD to work as “part-
time” members of PMOs or members of the Integrated Product Teams. Project managers 
should be empowered to make final decisions about theirs projects, select their team 
members and control funds of their projects.  
6. Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins 
According to the survey35 that examined the most common pitfalls of 
implementing a change in 93 medium- and large-sized firms - 76% of the respondents 
answered: 
Implementation took more time than originally expected 
Based on this survey, we can conclude that employees become quickly impatient 
and frustrated if they do not see tangible results of their efforts. In such a situation, 
maintaining their full commitment and stimulate progress in the organization is quite 
difficult. 
Planning for and creating short-term wins is the most effective method of 
overcoming this problem. Organizations should continuously look for short-term goals, 
achieve them, and reward employees. The entire process of implementing a change 
should consist of several short-term goals and objectives. 
7. Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More Change 
After change has begun, the guiding coalition must ensure that all improvements 
are consolidated and the appropriate bases for Total Quality Management are established. 
The employees in the MoND must realize that effectively managing the acquisition 
system requires constant improvements and modifications. A proactive approach should 
be promoted versus a reactive approach. Procuring authorities must ensure that the 
acquisition process in the PAF always meets or exceeds the present market and final 
users expectations.     
                                                 
35 Larry Alexander, Successfully Implementing Strategic Decisions, p.91-97, 1985 
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 8. Institutionalizing New Approaches 
Institutionalizing the project management could be accomplished by initiating 
project management courses and training in Poland. Appropriate structure for the Bureau 
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APPENDIX B – PROJECT MANAGER CHARTER36  
 
By decree of the Minister of National Defense (# and date of decree) and by appointment 





(rank, first name, second name) 
 
 




(name of the project) 
 
 
As Project Manager, you will function as centralized manager for your assigned project, 
reporting directly to the Director of the Bureau of Project Management. 
 
 
You will, as the responsible management official, provide overall direction and guidance 
for the development acquisition, testing, product improvements and fielding of assigned 
systems. 
 
You will ensure transparency, integrity and fairness of your project. 
 
You will place primary management emphasis on cost, schedule and performance, 
program integration, interoperability and oversight. 
 
 
You are accountable to the Director of the Bureau of Project Management for fulfillment 
of all responsibilities listed in this charter. 
 
 
You are hereby delegated the full line of authority in all the aspects listed in this charter. 
                                                 
36 This appendix was written based on the charter of Col. Michael W. Boudreau 
who was assigned as the Project Manager for Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles for 
US Army and the mythical charter of Mr. Robert L. James who was assigned as the 
Project Manager for the Acme Project in Electrodynamics Corp, described in Kerzner’s 





1. Actively assist the final users during requirements generation 
2. Ensure that all PMO and IPT members are kept informed of their responsibilities 
 on the project 
3. Keep the executive management informed as to project status through monthly 
 (detailed) and yearly (summary) status reporting 
4. Conduct market research 
5. Supervise development of specifications 
6. Conduct life-cycle cost analysis and the project cost estimation 
7. Conduct risk analysis 
8. Conduct quality planning 
9. Develop realistic project schedule and propose project’s milestones to the 
 Director of the Bureau of Project Management 
10. Conduct all formal communication between the MoND and the contractor. 
11. Supervise Feasibility Study and Product Development 
12. Compare actual to predicted cost and performance and take corrective action 
 when necessary 
13. Supervise initial production testing by the final users and the military 
 technological institutes and provide recommendation to the Director of Armament 
 Policy Department about initiation of serial production 
14. Supervise quality control 
15. Develop in cooperation with the contractor plan for support of the system during 
 the operating phase 





1. Control funds of the project 
2. Direct access to all documents related to the project 
3. Select PMO and IPT members in cooperation with functional managers 
4. Renegotiate with functional managers for changes in personnel assignments 
5. Organize PMO and IPT meetings at least twice a month 
6. Require periodic functional status reporting from “full-time” and “part-time” 
 PMO and IPT members 
7. Provide inputs to yearly evaluation reports of the PMO and IPT members 
8. Represent the project in the mass media 
9. Represent the final users in all negotiations with contractors 
 
       Signed, 
 
      ……………………… 
    (The Director of the Bureau of Project Management) 
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APPENDIX C – TEN TIPS FOR PROJECT MANAGERS37 
1. Know Your Neighborhood. 
The project manager should establish very close relationships with all his project 
stakeholders. He should constantly analyze theirs interests, bargaining position, priorities, 
strength and weaknesses.   
2. Pay Them Now or, Pay Them Later. 
This statement or saying means that the project manager must listen to people and 
organizations and give them due consideration. If the PM fails to work cooperatively and 
fairly, others will find a way to “pay” him for being unfair or uncooperative. 
3. It’s More Than Paper. It’s Your Contract. 
 Written contract is one of the most important elements of the acquisition process. 
Everything that is enclosed in the contract becomes the roadmap that must be fulfilled 
unless there is a mutual amendment to it. All potential disputes will be judged based on 
the contract. The PM must ensure that the contract precisely expresses all the final users’ 
interests in the project. It must be clear, transparent, and lack ambiguity. 
4. Just Say “No.” 
The PM’s position depends on the success of his project. In order to keep his 
project alive, sometimes a PM may be willing to promise too much. However, he must be 
aware that everything what was promised must be fulfilled. The customers are very 
happy when they are provided more than expected, but on the other hand, they are very 
disappointed when they are provided less than promised.    
5. It Is the Engineering, Stupid. 
Development of the final product requires a systems engineering effort. The PM 
does not have to be a technical specialist. However, he must ensure that real experts are 
                                                 
37 S. Hawthorne’s lecture in Naval Postgraduate School in August, 2003 
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involved in the development of the specifications, the feasibility studies, tradeoff 
analyses quality control and testing of the final product. 
6. Software Bytes. 
Software is essential to virtually all of our warfighting systems. The PM may not 
be an expert in system software development, but he can insist that software development 
be controlled by well-defined and constantly improved practices. Sloppy software 
development will damage or destroy a warfighting system project. 
7. Test a Little - Learn a Lot. 
Testing is very important in the acquisition process. Serial production must 
always be preceded by testing of the prototypes and early production units. Field testing 
of the product should be conducted by the final users to ensure that it meets user 
requirements. 
8. Walk the Line. Don’t Cross It. 
The PM must be very careful when he requests additional funds for his project. 
He could be easily accused of bad planning, wastefulness or ineffectiveness.  
9. The Only Thing Constant Is Change. 
There are many uncertainties associated with every project. It is not possible to 
predict all obstacles and barriers initially. The PM must be ready to modify his project to 
address the present conditions of the market and the final users’ expectations.    
10. I’m from OSD. I’m here to Help.  
OSD stands for the Office of Secretary of Defense in the U.S. The equivalent of 
OSD in the PAF is the Minister of National Defense. The last of Mr. Hawthorne’s tips for 
PMs suggests keeping the highest authorities in the MoND constantly well informed 
about the progress of the project. The Director of the Bureau of Project Management, the 
Secretary of State and the Minister of National Defense could be very helpful in 
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